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IN MEMORIAM: WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S ENDURING,
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
RICHARD W. GARNETT
We have all heard, read, and (probably) argued a good deal
lately about the "judicial philosophy" of nominees to and Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of the United States.' Senate staffers,
pundits, "big media" journalists, and bloggers have scoured
the sources, including college research papers, job applications,
appellate briefs, opinions, and even thank-you notes 2 looking
for clues (or smoking guns). What would really be useful,
though, are more documents like Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist's essay The Notion of a Living Constitution.
3
* Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
Professor Garnett served as one of Chief Justice Rehnquist's law clerks during
October Term 1996.
1. See, e.g., Mike Allen & R. Jeffrey Smith, Judges Should Have "Limited" Role,
Roberts Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A5 ("Roberts echoed the views of
President Bush in describing his judicial philosophy. Roberts said that he views
the role of judges as 'limited' and that they 'do not have a commission to solve
society's problems, as they see them, but simply to decide cases before them
according to the rule of law."'); Peter Baker & Shailagh Murray, Bush Defends
Supreme Court Pick, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2005, at Al ("A day after tapping White
House counsel Harriet Miers for associate justice, Bush appeared in the Rose
Garden to reject charges of cronyism, criticism of her scant constitutional
background and suspicion of her judicial philosophy."); Senator Charles Schumer,
News Conference on the Nomination of Judge Alito to the Supreme Court,
Transcript: Sen. Schumer's Remarks on the Alito Nomination, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artide/2005/10/31/AR2005103
100707.html ("A preliminary review of his record raises real questions about
Judge Alito's judicial philosophy and his commitment to civil rights, workers'
rights, women's rights, the rights of average Americans which the courts have
always looked out for.").
2. See Charles Babington, Miers Hit on Letters and the Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
2005, at A7.
3. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976), reprinted in 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (2006).
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This short piece was delivered as the Will E. Orgain Lecture
and then published thirty years ago, back when Rehnquist was
still the "Lone Ranger 4 -"the Boss," and not "the Chief," to
his clerks-and a relatively junior Associate Justice. And, not
taking anything away from Princeton graduate Samuel Alito's
senior thesis on the Italian Constitutional Court,5 or now-Chief
Justice Roberts's article exploring the limits on statutory stand-
ing imposed by Article 111,6 Rehnquist's article is about as clear,
succinct, and coherent a statement of judicial philosophy as one
could want. The members and editors of the Harvard Journal of
Law & Public Policy and the Texas Law Review deserve our
thanks for their initiative and generosity in reproducing this
important, provocative, and-to many of us-compelling
document.
Now, it is a challenge for anyone-even one of the great
Chief Justices of the United States7 -who ventures into the
"Living Constitution" debate to identify with reasonable preci-
sion just what it is that one is defending or debunking, if only
to avoid the unenviable, "necrophil[iac]" position of playing
partisan for a "dead" Constitution.8 After all, as Rehnquist was
happy to concede, there seems no reason to resist what he
called in his essay the "Holmes version" of the Living Constitu-
tion, that is, the observation that, in many cases, "[t]he framers
of the Constitution" -like those who "framed, adopted, and
ratified the Civil War amendments" -"wisely spoke in general
4. "When Richard Nixon appointed Rehnquist to the court in 1971 at the age of
47, he was a young firebrand, with bushy sideburns, loud clothes, a cocksure
manner, and fiercely conservative views. He quickly became a bomb-thrower on the
court, launching provocative dissents and staking out solitary terrain on the
court's right wing. His clerks in those years famously gave him a 'Lone Ranger'
doll in recognition of his role on the court." Cliff Sloan, Whatever Happened to the
Lone Ranger?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/6495396/site/newsweek/from/RL.2/.
5. Chanakya Sethi, Nominee's Missing Thesis Recovered, DAILY PRINCETONIAN,
.Nov. 8, 2005 (quoting Professor Walter Murphy's statement that "Alito's thesis
was one of only about a half-dozen he kept over the years because of the quality
of its scholarship").
6. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219
(1993).
7. The former acting Solicitor General, Professor Walter Dellinger, has
concluded, "William H. Rehnquist will likely be seen as one of the three most
influential chief justices in history, surpassed perhaps only by John Marshall and
Earl Warren." Walter Dellinger, In Memoriam, SLATE, Sept. 4, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2125685/.
8. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 693 ("At first blush it seems certain that a living
Constitution is better than what must be its counterpart, a dead Constitution.").
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language and left to succeeding generations the task of apply-
ing that language to the unceasingly changing environment in
which they would live."9 He might even have agreed (over a
"Miller's Lite," perhaps) 10 with his longtime judicial sparring
partner, Justice William Brennan, that "the Constitution is not a
static document whose meaning on every detail is fixed for all
time by the life experience of the Framers."" And although we
can be sure he would have rolled his eyes at Justice Louis
Brandeis's image of the Constitution as a "living organism," he
probably would have agreed readily that the Constitution "is
not a straight-jacket."
12
For then-Justice Rehnquist, the "Notion of a Living Constitu-
tion" was not to be resisted out of pious reverence for the
Founders' insight into the moral, economic, and social chal-
lenges facing late-twentieth-century society. 13 Nor did his cri-
tique purport to be the product of a tight deduction from
9. Id. at 694.
10. When eating lunch with his law clerks-with this law clerk, anyway-the
Chief often ordered a cheeseburger and (what he called) a "Miller's Lite."
11. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
William J. Brennan, Jr., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7
(1985) ("[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might
have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs.").
12. William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
425, 426 (1989) (quoting and citing Justice Brandeis). I can only imagine the
temptations Rehnquist resisted during his 1986 confirmation hearings when he
was asked, "How can you not acknowledge that the Constitution is a living,
breathing document?" Nomination of Justice William H. Rehnquist to be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 354
(1986) (question of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
13. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 699 ("It seems to me that it is almost
impossible ... to conclude that [the Founders] intended the Constitution itself to
suggest answers to the manifold problems that they knew would confront
succeeding generations."); cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 717
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Those who valiantly but vainly defended the
heights of Bunker Hill in 1775 made it possible that men such as James Madison
might later sit in the first Congress and draft the Bill of Rights to the Constitution.
The post-Civil War Congresses which drafted the Civil War Amendments to the
Constitution could not have accomplished their task without the blood of brave
men on both sides which was shed at Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Cold Harbor. If
those responsible for these Amendments, by feats of valor or efforts of
draftsmanship, could have lived to know that their efforts had enshrined in the
Constitution the right of commercial vendors of contraceptives to peddle them to
unmarried minors through such means as window displays and vending
machines located in the men's room of truck stops, notwithstanding the
considered judgment of the New York Legislature to the contrary, it is not
difficult to imagine their reaction.").
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
premises relating to the very nature of a written constitution.
He was not-to use Professor Sunstein's term 14- a "fundamen-
talist," or even a thoroughgoing, principled "originalist." He
did not fail to observe and absorb the obvious fact that ours is a
very different world from that of the Framers.
To understand Rehnquist's critique of the Living Constitu-
tion-and, more generally, his judicial philosophy-it is essen-
tial to understand that his aim was not to deny or resist
constitutional change, but instead to insist and, to the extent
possible, ensure that the people- "We the People," the "ulti-
mate source of authority in this Nation"15-acting through their
politically accountable representatives, retain the right to serve
(or not) as the agents of and vehicles for that change. What
animates Rehnquist's essay-and, indeed, his career on the
Court-is not a misplaced attachment to stasis, or a slavish ad-
herence to ideological formulae, but a clear-eyed appreciation
for the tension that can exist between the "antidemocratic and
antimajoritarian facets" of judicial review-a power that, he
reminded us, "require[s] some justification in this Nation,
which prides itself on being a self-governing representative
democracy"16 - and the "political theory basic to democratic
society." 17
So, then-Justice Rehnquist contended, it is one thing to note
that the Constitution is, in many places, "not a specifically
worded document" and that "[tihere is ... wide room for hon-
est difference of opinion over the meaning of general phrases
in the Constitution." 18 It is another, though, to authorize
"nonelected members of the federal judiciary," functioning as
"the voice and conscience of contemporary society" and "as the
measure of the modern conception of human dignity," 19 to
serve as a "council of revision" 20 armed "with a roving com-
mission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state
14. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-
WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005).
15. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 696.
16. Id. at 695-96.
17. Id. at 705; see also id. at 706 (concluding that the Living Constitution is "a
formula for an end run around popular government" and is "genuinely corrosive
of the fundamental values of our democratic society").
18. Id. at 697.
19. Id. at 695.
20. Id. at 698.
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and federal administrative officers concerning what is best for
the country."
21
About ten years after Rehnquist's Orgain Lecture, Justice
Brennan responded to Rehnquist's assertion that "because ours
is a government of the people's elected representatives, sub-
stantive value choices should by and large be left to them." 22
Justice Brennan acknowledged that although this view "has
appeal under some circumstances ... it ultimately will not do."
After all, "[flaith in democracy is one thing, blind faith quite
another.... It is the very purpose of our Constitution... to de-
clare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of tempo-
rary political majorities." 23
Justice Brennan's argument is important, and it should be
emphasized that, throughout his career, Rehnquist engaged
and responded to it. Certainly, the notion that the powers and
the authority of the government should not wax and wane
with the whims of "temporary political majorities" is one that
Rehnquist readily and enthusiastically endorsed. 24 He recog-
nized that the People, in and through the Constitution, im-
posed limits on government "in the form of both a division of
powers and express protection for individual rights." 25 In
Rehnquist's view, though, the constraints on majoritarianism
are and should be limited to those that the People have im-
posed on themselves and authorized judges to enforce.
Now, it is no small problem for anyone thinking of taking on
the Living Constitution that, in Professor Jack Balkin's words,
"[w]e are all living constitutionalists now." After all, he in-
sisted, "Nobody, and I mean nobody, whether Democrat or
Republican, really wants to live under the Constitution accord-
21. Id.; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihis Court seems to regard the Equal Protection Clause as a cat-o'-
nine-tails to be kept in the judicial closet as a threat to legislatures which may, in
the view of the judiciary, get out of hand and pass 'arbitrary,' 'illogical,' or
Iunreasonable' laws."); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 435 (1989) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) ("The Court's role as the final expositor of the Constitution is well
established, but its role as a Platonic guardian admonishing those responsible to
public opinion as if they were truant schoolchildren has no similar place in our
system of government.").
22. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986).
23. Id. at 436-37.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) ("We start with first
principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers.").
25. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 699.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
ing to the original understanding once they truly understand
what that entails." Put bluntly, "[N]o one truly believes in a
dead Constitution."26 True enough, but neither did Rehnquist.
His position, expressed in the essay that follows and developed
in his judicial work, was not that the Nation's Constitution is
dead, but that it lives and endures through the enactments of
its elected and accountable legislators and the debates and
votes of its People rather than through the "enlightened" up-
dating of its federal judges."
26. Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead
Constitution, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125226/.
27. See Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 699 (contending that the "nature of the
Constitution" is to "enable the popularly elected branches of government, not the
judicial branch, to keep the country abreast of the times").
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